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T.A. Cavanaugh, Philosophy, University of San Francisco 
Penultimate draft of: The Nazi! Accusation and Current U.S. Proposals, 
Bioethics, 11, Nos. 3-4, July 1997, pp. 291-297. 
 
 
THE NAZI! ACCUSATION AND CURRENT U.S. PROPOSALS 
 
In discussing the relevance of Nazi “euthanasia” to the practices of 
physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and voluntary active euthanasia (VAE), 
currently proposed for legalization in the U.S., there are at least two reasons 
for putting scare quotes around ‘euthanasia’ when referring to the Nazi 
practice of killing, amongst others, the mentally ill, the handicapped, 
epileptics, and certain children and infants.
i
 First, to call what contemporary 
advocates of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and voluntary active euthanasia 
(VAE) propose Nazi! is hyperbolic. Second, it is an ad hominem, the very 
weakest of arguments, indeed, perhaps no argument at all. Calling people and 
practices names is odious and futile; for to say that PAS and VAE are or will 
become equivalent to what the Nazis did is not to offer reasons against either 
practice. Indeed, to call the German “euthanasia” program Nazi! is not to 
argue even against that program, for those killings were not wrong merely 
because Nazis did the killing.
ii
 
 Late Twentieth Century ethical discourse has relied on the Nazis to 
exemplify the category of the absolutely wrong with too little reflection on the 
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circumstances that lead to this rhetorical strategy. Nazis serve as a convenient 
prop to be dusted off and pointed to by those speaking in a society permeated 
by emotivism, the position that ethical discourse is constituted entirely of 
assertions and counter-assertions of taste. Since contemporary disputants do 
not agree about the substantive points and first principles from which ethical 
reasoning begins they find it difficult to achieve closure.
iii
 Those who rely on 
the Nazi! accusation assume or hope that everyone agrees that the Nazi killing 
practices are always and everywhere wrong. Thus, instead of being forced to 
sit in perpetual sackcloth and ashes, Nazis putatively function as the one point 
of agreement from which public ethical argument can depart confidently. This 
idol of the forum is wobbling precariously, however, as those who teach ethics 
realize. Students lack confidence that they can establish, nor is there reason to 
think that they have been provisioned with the resources to argue, that what 
the Nazis did was absolutely, transculturally, everywhere and at every time 
wrong. Their lack of confidence reflects one popularly accepted emotivist 
position: that disagreement is shrill and interminable because ethical matters 
do not admit of truth. Indeed, the phenomenon of the Nazi! charge reflects 
despair precisely in the face of the conviction that there are no ethical truths. 
Interlocutors are reduced to assertion and counter-assertion, one making and 
the other denying the accusation. The Nazi! accusation -- used in divergent 
ways by myriad parties -- should be understood as an ethical cri de cœur of 
interlocutors attempting to find that much coveted Archimedean place to stand 
and from which to bring shared moral convictions to bear on our public 
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practical reflections. 
 This charge, however, should be put aside in contemporary 
discussions; for it eviscerates discourse of standards on both sides of the 
debate. Opponents of contemporary PAS and VAE would need to make the 
Nazi! accusation stick; proponents would need only to escape from the Nazi 
shadows. Neither is enough; for neither is ultimately conclusive or convincing. 
Just as some practice is not wrong merely because the Nazis did it or merely 
because it will lead to what the Nazis did do, so also, no practice is justified 
solely by the fact that the Nazis did not do it or because it will not lead to 
what they did do. 
 Keeping the scare quotes on ‘euthanasia’ in the phrase ‘Nazi 
“euthanasia”’ and putting the Nazi! accusation away, let us ask: first, what 
general philosophical presuppositions does Nazi “euthanasia” share with PAS 
and VAE as currently proposed for legalization in the U.S.? second, what 
made Nazi “euthanasia” unique? third, what contemporary characteristics of 
the U.S. would specify the philosophical presuppositions underlying PAS and 
VAE? 
 The first general presupposition common to the practices in question is 
the notion that there are certain lives that ought not to be lived, and, more 
importantly, that the fact that those lives ought not to be lived partially 
justifies homicide. Nazis spoke of a life being unworthy of life -- 
lebensunwerten Lebens.
iv
 This way of speaking indicates that the Nazis 
regarded the subject, an individual human being, as not being worthy of the 
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property of being alive. Contemporary advocates of PAS and VAE speak of 
life, under certain conditions, as not worth living. They regard the individual 
as having a property that is not worth having. Thus, the Nazis devalued the 
subject who possessed life while contemporary advocates of PAS and VAE 
question the value of the life possessed by the subject. In both cases the 
inference is made that a life that ought not to be lived ought to be ended 
actively. 
 This shared inference is itself significant. For from the position that a 
life ought not to be lived, it need not follow that the life ought to be ended. 
One might reasonably hold that some life ought not to be lived while not 
holding that if such a life were being lived it ought to be ended. For example, a 
mother of children whose lives are chronically punctuated by suffering might 
reasonably choose not to have another child because she judges the life it 
would have as a life that ought not to exist. Yet, she need not thereby be 
committed to killing her children who are leading such lives. Thus, it is 
significant that both the Nazis and contemporary proponents of PAS and VAE 
assume that from the fact that a life ought not to exist, it follows that such a 
life ought to be ended actively. 
 Nazi “euthanasia” and the practices of PAS and VAE offer homicide 
as an answer to the question: what does one do with a life that ought not to 
exist? This reveals another presupposition common to these positions. 
Namely, that life itself cannot be trusted with life; that the body does not have 
its own reasons of which reason is sometimes not aware. This judgment that 
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the lives that ought not to be lived cannot be entrusted to nature nevertheless 
relies on certain idealized views of nature in terms of which precisely which 
lives those are can be discerned. That is, the lives that ought not to be lived are 
determined in biological terms vis-à-vis ideals of health and human 
flourishing. 
 The Nazi biological ideal was racist, the purity of the Aryan Volk.
v
 
The Aryan race was all too human for the Nazis, as evidenced by what they 
could regard only as its unsightly embarrassments to be gotten rid of: children 
with hydrocephaly, microcephaly, or Down’s syndrome; adults with withered 
legs, senility, or epilepsy. Thus, the Nazis made the judgment that a life was 
not worth living in terms of and on behalf of a racist idealization of a 
biologically purified Aryan Volk. 
 Contemporary proponents of PAS and VAE make the judgment that a 
life is not worth living in terms of the physical qualities of that life.
vi
 This is a 
labile concept; nonetheless, amongst the proponents of PAS and VAE, there is 
a consensus that certain conditions render life not worth living: a terminal 
illness with intractable physical pain or a chronic progressively debilitating 
disease.
vii
 Thus, although they agree that the criteria grounding the judgment 
that a life ought not to exist are generally biological, Nazis and contemporary 
advocates of PAS and VAE base this judgment on different biological 
standards. 
 More importantly, although Nazis and contemporary advocates in 
principle agree that there are lives that ought not to be lived, the two groups 
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offer distinct loci for giving this judgment authority. Contemporary advocates 
hold that while all of us can make the judgment that a life is not worth living, 
only the one living that life makes the judgment authoritatively. Thus, 
contemporary advocates hope to insure that of those lives that are not worth 
living -- for example, a life with an incurable progressively debilitating disease 
-- only those judged to be not worth living by the one living the life will be 
taken.
viii
 
 Nazis, on the other hand, were indifferent to whether or not the 
individual or surrogate agreed with them that the life ought to be ended. It is 
true that Hitler -- always the opportunist -- did begin the killing by responding 
to the Knauer family’s request that a handicapped infant be killed,ix and the 
Nazis did kill some children whose parents wanted them to be killed and some 
adults whose spouses or children wanted them to be killed.
x
 These killings, 
however, were merely the inevitable coincidental agreements between state 
and family that occur when upwards of seventy thousand people are killed.
xi
 
 Turning to the contemporary U.S., a number of factors will further 
specify the general philosophical presuppositions grounding PAS and VAE. 
The first concern the practical and public dynamics of the logic underlying 
PAS and VAE. Most advocates of PAS and VAE want to keep the two 
primary criteria of the justification together -- that the death be voluntary and 
brought about for a good reason. These criteria, however, exist in tension with 
one another -- as is evidenced by those soft paternalists who think that really 
wanting to die is itself a sufficiently good reason for PAS or VAE.
xii
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Moreover, these criteria face the perhaps peculiarly American dynamic by 
which the legal develops from what people may do into what people do to 
become what people ought to do. In the States, the legally permissible 
becomes the norm which in turn becomes the socially obligatory. As patients 
with terminal progressively debilitating diseases choose to kill themselves or 
to be killed they establish a social norm. However, once this becomes the 
social norm the burden of justification shifts to those who depart from it. As 
the conviction takes publicly that others significantly like them were correctly 
killed because they had a good reason to be killed and acknowledging this 
asked to be assisted or to be killed, so also to that very extent the conviction 
develops that some are not being reasonable in not wanting death. If the law 
accepts these practices, it thereby undermines the autonomy of those who have 
the same reasons to be killed but do not apprehend them as being good reasons 
for being killed. Of course, some will find this description true to their own 
experience of social norms and pressures while others will find it unduly 
speculative. There is, however, another more practical exigency that will 
particularize these practices in the States, namely, the phenomenon of 
capitation. 
 Advocates of PAS and VAE tend to romanticize the compassionate 
killing of those who want to be killed without sufficient reflection on the way 
in which health care has come to be delivered and will continue to be 
delivered in the States.
xiii
 In a fee-for-service environment, a physician is paid 
for the services she provides to her patients. Thus, she is tempted to do more 
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in order to make more. In a capitated system, however, a physician is paid 
more the less she does. Thus, her temptation changes from doing more to 
doing less in order to make more. This is not to argue against capitation as a 
means by which to control health care costs. Nonetheless, when introducing 
PAS and VAE into a context in which capitation is becoming the standard and 
health care costs are thought to be out of control, one must realize that 
significant savings are to be had in convincing those who have become 
expensive in terms of health care that death is one option for them. Significant 
amounts of money could be made by killing the sickest patients, especially 
those terminally ill who have no prospect of returning to work or to conditions 
of health in which they would make net financial contributions to health care 
costs. Once law legitimates killing those who judge their lives to be not worth 
living, it legitimates making and saving money by killing those people. In 
order to convince these individuals and their physicians, why not advertise, 
promote or incentivize death as the therapy of choice? One would be innocent 
of any knowledge of human motivation if one thought that the desire for gain 
were not a significant and largely ungovernable factor facing the legalization 
of PAS and VAE, particularly in the United States where medicine and health 
insurance are large for-profit enterprises. As others have argued, one need not 
reject PAS and VAE as unethical in order to reject the legalization of these 
practices.
xiv
 
 Returning to the Nazi! accusation, one further reason becomes evident 
for ridding ourselves of that charge in our discussions of PAS and VAE. 
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Facing that accusation we may find ourselves confidently saying “that would 
never happen here.” In this way the Nazi! accusation and the relatively easy 
refutation of it console us, as if our greatest concern were that we not become 
neo-Nazis. Our own specific temptations, however, require greater attention, 
for they are much more ordinarily humane and human. 
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